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BROWN'S PROMISE, BLAINE'S LEGACY
CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND CML SOCIETY. By Joseph P.
Viteritti. 1 Brookings Institution Press. 1999. Pp. 284.
$29.95.
Richard W. Garnett2

If nothing else, this Review Essay, like Professor Viteritti's
book, should be timely. As I write, the United States Supreme
Court in Mitchell v. Helms 3 has just decided that publicly funded
computers and other educational materials may be loaned to
private and religious schools. The decision is widely viewed as
signaling, if not determining, the constitutional fate of schoolchoice experiments like those in Cleveland and Milwaukee.4 As
it happened, just one week before Mitchell, the Sixth Circuit
heard oral arguments in Simmons-Harris v. Zelman5 (the Ohio
voucher case) as hundreds of voucher supporters chanted "freedom, freedom!" across the street from the federal court in downtown Cincinnati.6 A challenge to Florida's statewide voucher
1. Research Professor of Public Administration, Wagner School of Public Service,
New York University.
2. Assistant Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I'm grateful to Brendan
Gardiner and Fred Marczyk for their assistance with this and other projects, and to
Gerard Bradley, James Dwyer, Nicole Garnett, Steffen Johnson, William Kelley, John
Nagle, Michael Paulsen, Steven Smith, and Eugene Volokh for their comments and criticisms. Richard Garnett can be contacted at <rick.garnett.4@nd.edu>.
3. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
4. See, e.g., Jodi Wilgoren, Court Ruling Fuels Debate on Vouchers for Education,
N.Y. Times A21 (June 29, 2000); Chester E. Finn, Jr., and Charles R. Hokanson, Jr.,
Court Ruling Augurs Well for Vouchers, Wall. St. J. A26 (June 29, 2000).
5. The author of this Review Essay helped write the amicus curiae brief filed by
the Center for Education Reform in support of the Cleveland choice program.
6. Francis Griggs and Sharon Moloney, While Lawyers Arguing, Rally Touts
School Choice, Cin. Post 7A (June 21, 2000). In Zelman, Ohio is asking the Court of
Appeals to reverse a district-court ruling that the Ohio Pilot Scholarship Program violates the Establishment Clause. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D.
Ohio 1999). Just before this Essay went to press, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision in Zelman, reasoning that the Cleveland schoolchoice program "has the primary effect of advancing religion and that it constitutes an
endorsement of religion and sectarian education in violation of the Establishment
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program is pending before a state appeals court, and choice proposals will be on the ballot this November in Michigan and California.7 It is, one activist reports, "High Noon" for vouchers. 8
Enter Joseph Viteritti (cue spaghetti-western-style, ominously
poignant whistling), who has written a readable and reasonable,
measured yet inspiring, argument for educational choice. 9
I
"Vouchers" is, for many liberals and progressives, a dirty
word; such a nasty word, in fact, that when the Vice President
and his campaign staff were making the talk-show rounds last
winter to critique Senator Bradley's health-care plan, they were
careful to note, over and again, their horror barely concealed,
that Bradley was proposing "vouchers." 10 What's more-as was
illustrated last February during the Bradley-Gore debate at the
Apollo Theater-it is evidently thought to be politically safer to
risk snubbing the many African American parents who favor
school choice than even to appear sympathetic to voucher proposals.11
Clause." Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 961 (6th Cir. 2000). In my view, the
Sixth Circuit's ruling coheres neither with controlling precedent nor common sense, and
should be reviewed and reversed by the United States Supreme Court. Sec, e.g., Judgment Day, Wash. Post A26 (Dec. 18, 2000) {"The good news is that no one, least of all
the court itself, really expects this to be the last word").
7. Editorial, School Is Out, Wall St. J. A46 (June 26, 2000). As this Essay is going
to press, the protracted 2000 presidential election has finally ended, and voters in Michigan and California resoundingly rejected the school-choice initiatives proposed in those
states. See, e.g., Voters Approved School-Funding Proposals in Referendum Voting, Wall
St. J. A17 (Nov. 9, 2000) ("By more than 3-to-l, ... voters in California and Michigan
turned down proposals that would have committed their states to offering school vouchers").
8. Ron Unz, High Noon for Vouchers, Nat'! Rev. Online, June 20, 2000 ("Now,
suddenly, a chain of unconnected events will decide the triumph or collapse of the
voucher movement-by the end of the year") (see <http://www.nationalrcvicw.com>).
9. Professor Viteritti has developed these ideas in earlier works. Sec generally
Joseph P. Viteritti, Reaching For Equality: The Salience of School Choice, 14 J.L. & Pol.
469 (1998); Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, The First Amendment, and
State Constitutional Law, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 657 (1998); Joseph P. Vitcritti, Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and Educational Opportunity Under Constitutional Federalism, 15 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 113 (1996).
10. Debra J. Saunders, Gore Masters Psychological Warfare, S.F. Chron. A25 (Jan.
28, 1999) ("In debate after debate, Gore hit Bradley's 'voucher' plan that was 'capped' at
$150 per month. It was a double misrepresentation. The Bradley plan would operate
through tax credits, not vouchers-a loaded word among Democrats who might hear the
word and think school vouchers").
11. During the Apollo Theater debate, one journalist asked the Vice President,
given that so many African Americans support school choice and that the Vice President
and his children are products of private schools, "why should ... parents (who support
vouchers] have to keep their kids in public schools because they don't have the financial
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This makes no sense to Joseph Viteritti, an "old school" liberal who offers in Choosing Equality what some might call a
"bleeding heart" argument for choice in education. The book
opens not with a libertarian nugget from Hayek or the Cato Institute; and not with red-meat-for-conservatives anecdotes about
mandatory condom-distribution programs, Gaia worship, or
public-school secularism run amok; but instead with the story of
Linda Brown: "Nearly half a century has passed since the parents of a little black girl from Topeka, Kansas, entered a federal
court room to argue that every child in America has an equal
right to a decent education." (p. 1) Still, "[n]otwithstanding
Linda Brown's courageous efforts to fulfill the promise of equality and a range of well-intentioned government actions, race and
class remain the most reliable predictors of educational
achievement in the United States." (Id.) This, Viteritti insists, is
the "most compelling argument" for school choice. (p. 223)
Viteritti admits, of course, that there are many reasons why
people support (and oppose) school choice. 12 When Milton
Friedman first proposed a "full-fledged system of school vouchers" that "would minimize the role of government in education
and replace public schools with privately run institutions supported bl taxes," (p. 53) many libertarians cheered, and many
still do. 1 In the early 1970s, progressive social scientists like
Christopher Jencks, John Coons, and Stephen Sugarman turned
to vouchers as an income-redistribution and empowerment device,14 themes that many education-reform and civil-rights activists still invoke today. 15 And more recently, many religious conservatives have embraced school choice as a way to challenge
resources that you do?" Another questioner inquired of both candidates, why shouldn't
parents conclude that the Democratic Party's opposition to choice is supporting a special
interest rather than their interest?" Both candidates were unmoved. See Editorial, No
Choice for Democrats, Wall St. J. A22 (Feb. 23, 2000); see also Floyd H. Flake, Gore's
Achilles Heel, N.Y. Times A15 (Mar. 12, 2000) (claiming that "Mr. Gore did not answer
[the] question in any real way. That won't do").
12. For a fairly representative snapshot of the debate, see Gary Rosen, Are School
Vouchers Un-American?, Commentary 26, Feb. 2000; Gary Rosen & Critics, Are School
Vouchers the Answer?, Commentary 16, June 2000.
13. Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in Robert A. Solo, ed.,
Economics and the Public Interest (Greenwood Press, 1955).
14. See, e.g., Christopher Jencks, Education Vouchers: A Report on Financing Education by Payments to Parents (1970); John E. Coons, William H. Clune and Stephen D.
Sugarman, Private Wealth and Public Education (Belknap Press, 1970); John E. Coons
and Stephen D. Sugarman, Family Choice in Education: A Model State System for
Vouchers, 59 Cal. L. Rev. 321 (1971).
15. See, e.g., Floyd H. Flake, How Do We Save Inner-City Children?, Pol'y Rev. 48
(Jan-Feb. 1999).
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what they regard as the increasingly aggressive secularism of the
public schools' curriculum and culture. (pp. 56-57)
The leitmotif of Choosing Equality, though, is Linda
Brown's lawsuit, and the book's animating goal is to "explain
how choice might be applied ... to advance the goal of equality." (p. 2) In Viteritti's view, Brown promised "not only equality of educational opportunity for blacks, but full partnership in
the American experiment." (p. 3) He aims to show that school
choice holds out the best hope for making good on that promise.
And he suggests that, given the support for choice programs
among those to whom the Brown Court most clearly made its
pledge, (pp. 5-9) 16 it is appropriate to place the burden of persuasion on those who oppose such reforms. As one of Viteritti's
apparent converts put it, "[a]s a parent of an urban public highschool student, I flinch at anything that drains resources from
public schools. But I have a choice. Keeping them from others
because of a vague threat seems increasingly hard to justify." 17
Choosing Equality is about a big idea-"equality." In the
legal academy, though, school-choice discussions tend to focus
on the fine points and various "prongs" of First Amendment
doctrine and "tests." And so, one could be forgiven for thinking
of the book, "Not another tour through the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause mess?" Fear not. Choosing Equality is an
engaging contribution both to the education-reform arena and to
the broader dialogue about the place of religion and religious institutions in public life. Particularly in a political season, the case
for (and against) choice in education can too easily "morph" into
partisan posturing and interest-group gamesmanship.
In
Viteritti's view, it doesn't have to be this way. For him, school

16. Low-income citizens and racial minorities are more likely to support choice in
education than are middle- and high-income whites. See, e.g., David A. Bositis, 1999 National Opinion Poll: Education, Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, at Table
5 (available at <http://www.jointcenter.org/selpaper/poll_edu99.htm>); Jeff Jacoby, The
Poor Favor School Choice, Boston Globe A19 (Dec. 27, 1999); Michael W. Lynch, Rampaging Toward Choice, Reason 24, 26 (Jan. 2000) ("Polls show that school choice is far
more popular with minorities than with whites, and most popular with low- and modestincome minorities"); James Brooke, Minorities Flock to Cause of Vouchers for Schools,
N.Y. Times Al (Dec. 27, 1997). But sec William Raspberry, A Little Knowledge Can Be
a Meaningless Thing, Wash. Post A23 (Nov. 29, 1999) (suggesting that parents' support
for school-choice is generally uninformed).
17. Geneva Overholser, Coming Around on Vouchers, Wash. Post A15 (Sept. 20,
1999) ("It's getting harder every day to be an informed and compassionate opponent of
vouchers. A new book called 'Choosing Equality' just may spell the end of my opposition").
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choice makes sense as a matter of shared constitutional and
moral ideals that are too important to be left to political junkies.
Here is Viteritti's argument, in a nutshell: First, the Brown
decision was not just about de-segregating public schools; it also
held out the more ambitious promise of meaningful racial equality in society. After Brown, Viteritti insists, equal educational
opQortunity should be regarded as a fundamental right. (pp. 2328) 1s
Second, fifty years of government-centered tinkering and
several hundred billion dollars in well-intentioned spending have
failed to make good on Brown's promise. It's time, Viteritti
thinks, to try something else. (pp. 28-52)
Third, choice-based reforms are often hamstrung by excessive regulatory controls. Magnet schools, charter schools, and
public-school-only choice programs are clearly steps in the right
direction, but they are not likely to capture the full creative potential of educational choice. (pp. 53-79)
Fourth, religious schools-particularly Catholic schoolsare the key to school choice. These schools equip disadvantaged
children for success in educational environments that are more
integrated, diverse, and consonant with the best of our commonschool ideals than are many of the public schools that purport to
serve the same children. (pp. 80-116)
Fifth, the Constitution permits governments to include religious schools in school-choice programs. Indeed, inclusive
school-choice programs better serve the religious-freedom values at the heart of the First Amendment than does strict "no-aid
separationism," 19 and they avoid the discrimination against religion that is no less offensive to the Constitution than is statesponsored orthodoxy. (pp.117-44)
Sixth, the strict no-funding provisions that were injected
into many States' constitutions during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries-in large part as a result of nativist
prejudices and suspicions toward the Catholic Church20 -are the
more formidable obstacles to school choice. A re-appraisal of
18. But cf. San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S 1 (1973) (education
not a "fundamental right" under the Equal Protection Clause).
19. See, e.g., Carl Es beck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid Separationism and the Establishment Clause, 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 285 (1999).
20. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 2000 WL 826246, at *24 (2000) (plurality
opinion) ("Consideration of the [Blaine] Amendment arose at a time of pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church and Catholics in general").
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these provisions, their history, their continuing discriminatory
effects, and of the common-school movement itself, is needed.
(pp. 145-79)
Seventh, school choice will not only promote educational
equality but also enrich the public square.2 Far from being balkanizing or insular, many neighborhood parochial and private
schools are valuable participants in the enterprise of creating
public-minded citizens, healthy mediating institutions, and a
thriving civil society. (pp. 180-208)22
Eighth, and finally, Viteritti proposes that governments implement broad choice programs for low-income children in failing public schools. These programs should include religious
schools (while requiring that these schools not discriminate on
the basis of race or religion in admissions) and at the same time
require that government-run schools remain secular. (pp. 20924) In the end, Viteritti concludes,
As with all crucial political issues, choice is a moral
question. It speaks to who we are as a people and to our
capacity to think beyond ourselves. The most compelling argument for school choice in America remains an
egalitarian one: education is such an essential public
good for living life in a free and prosperous society that
all people deserve equal access to its benefits regardless
of race, class, or philosophical disposition. There should
be no exceptions to the rule or excuses for the contrary.
(p. 223)

II
Viteritti observes early on in Choosing Equality that "discussions on the merits of school choice operate on two different
levels. As intellectuals engage in esoteric discourse on the abstractions of distributive justice, market dynamics, religious liberty, and civil society, the poor understand on a more visceral
level that it is their children who are trapped in inferior schools."
21. See generally Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion and
Democracy in America (W.B. Eerdmans, 1984).
22. See generally, e.g., Paul E. Peterson, School Choice: A Report Card, 6 Va. J.
Soc. Pol'y & L. 47, 72-73 (1998) ("Despite the rhetoric and scare tactics, choice critics
have failed to offer much evidence that school choice will balkanize America"); Christian
Smith and David Sikkink, Is Private School Privatizing?, First Things 16 (April 1999); Jay
P. Greene, Civic Values in Public and Private Schools, in Paul E. Peterson & Bryan C.
Hassel, eds., Learning from School Choice 83, 95-98 (Brookings Institution Press, 1998).
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(p. 11) In fact, "choice already exists for many if not most
Americans" and "those who do not enjoy choice really want it
for their own children." (pp. 11-12) Choosing Equality asks,
given these givens, whether school choice is something that those
who want it should want; whether it is something the Constitution permits government to provide; and whether it is something
that, in light of our Constitution and democratic ideals, we
should be eager to embrace. In other words, is school choice
sensible? Is it constitutional? Is it just?
Having identified "equality" -as opposed to, say, "efficiency," "competition," or "family values" -as the school-choice
endgame, Viteritti reviews nearly fifty years of post-Brown policymakers' efforts first to define and then to achieve that equality. (pp. 23-52) The story is familiar and depressing. 23 Although
Viteritti does not downplay the achievement of outlawing de jure
segregation, it remains true that, hundreds of billions of dollars
later, "most children who attend public school in the United
States today do so in a segregated setting" (p. 49) and black and
Latino students persistently lag behind whites in academic performance. If Brown's aim was to "realize racial equality through
educational opportunity. How this promise might be translated
into concrete public policy turned out to be a more daunting
challenge than anyone at the time could have imagined." (p. 27)
What went wrong? Choosing Equality traces several "false
starts" (p. 28) at "realizing racial equality," starting with the tumultuous implementation of the Court's "all deliberate speed"
mandate, continuing through the attempts to remedy the effects
of segregation through busing, and turning then. to the gradual
retreat in the legislatures and in the courts from court supervision of school districts as a school-reform tool. (pp. 29-34)24
Viteritti reports that, in the mid-1970s, researcher James Coleman concluded that the government's desegregation efforts were
actually increasing segregation (by prompting "white flight")
without corresponding gains in student performance.25 And by

23. For provocative and quite different take on this problem, see James Traub,
What No School Can Do, N.Y. Times (Magazine) 52, 54 (Jan. 16, 2000) ("[E]ducational
inequality is rooted in economic problems and social pathologies too deep to be overcome by school alone").
24. See, e.g., Board of Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); Freeman v. Pitts,
503 U.S. 467 (1992); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
25. James S. Coleman, et al., Trends in School Desegregation 1968-1973 (Urban Institute, 1975).
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1998, "80 percent of black parents said that they would prefer
schools to focus on achievement rather than integration." (p. 33)
Just as efforts to achieve "equality as racial integration" fizzled, so too did attempts at "equality as more spending" (pp. 3442) and "equality as political power." {pp. 42-49) 26 The "immense outpouring" of "well intentioned" dollars that began with
the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act "did not
prove to be effective in closing the achievement gap for disadvantaged children." {p. 35)27 Nor has the "equal money" approach worked much better than the "more money" strategy. In
1973, the Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez turned back an effort to constitutionalizethrough the Equal Protection Clause-parity in public-school
funding. 28 In so doing, though, the Court inspired state-lawbased equal-funding litigation in at least thirty-three States. This
litigation continues today and has resulted in substantial change
in the way many States fund public education. (pp. 37-42) 29
Still, "the preponderance of the research evidence continues to
support the findings that Coleman uncovered more than thirty
years ago: there is no consistent relationshi~ between education
spending and student achievement." (p. 42) 0
26. Viteritti describes in some detail the Great Society's "Community Action Program," which was designed to "bypass the traditional governmental institutions elected
citywide and to funnel money directly into communities where new units of power,
elected by community residents, determined how resources [were] to be disbursed." (p.
44)
27. One 1997 study concluded that over one hundred billion dollars in Title I spending had failed to produce "any difference in performance between program participants
and a control group." (p. 35) As Viteritti notes, however, Title I was hamstrung for
more than a decade by the Supreme Court's decision in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402
(1985), which held that public-school teachers could not provide federally funded remedial education on parochial-school grounds. The Court abandoned Aguilar in Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
28. 411 U.S 1 (1973). The California Supreme Court had held, in Serrano v. Priest,
5 Cal. 3d 584 (1971), that California's school-funding system discriminated against the
poor. But the Supreme Court in Rodriguez insisted that "the Equal Protection Clause
does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages" in education. 411 U.S.
at 24. Viteritti believes that Serrano was a "reasonable interpretation of the U.S. Constitution in the wake of Brown, which had deemed equality of opportunity a fundamental
right" and concludes that, in Rodriguez, the Court "appeared to be stepping back from
Brown." (p. 37)
29. The school-funding cases have also prompted vigorous debates over the point"
[at which] redistributive politics carried out in the name of equity begin to bunk up
against the liberty and property rights of those who are required to make a greater personal sacrifice." (p. 39) On school-funding litigation generally, see, e.g., James E. Ryan,
Schools, Race, and Money, 109 Yale L.J. 249 (1999).
30. See Traub, What No School Can Do at 55 (cited in note 23) ("Head Start, Title
I and a host of other programs have gone a long way toward proving one of Coleman's
central claims, which is that money does not buy educational equality").
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And so, Viteritti concludes, notwithstanding half a century
of experiments with political decentralization, new spending
programs, school-funding reform, and busing, the answer to the
"crucial question" - "whether [our] children are adequately
learning" -is, at least with respect to the most disadvantaged,
disappointing but clear: "Our public schools have failed miserably." (p. 51)
So, what about choice? Viteritti traces the evolution of the
school-choice idea from Milton Friedman's 1955 universalvoucher proposal through the current debates in Milwaukee,
Cleveland, Congress, and the courts. Friedman favored public
education but was "troubled by the dominance of a governmentrun bureaucracy in education that he believed perpetuated mediocrity." (p. 53) Although he spoke out of a philosophical tradition that claims not to be concerned with equality of results
and that purports to tolerate only a minimalist state, Friedman
(like Viteritti) "was unequivocal in his position that government
had an obligation to provide decent schooling to all at public expense." (p. 54) He understood that "without fostering equality
in educational outcomes, there could be no real equality of opportunity in a larger social context." (emphasis added) (pp. 55)
"Education" was for Friedman "the irreplaceable link that ties
the two together, an essential ingredient for both liberty and
equality in a democratic society." (p. 55) 31 Friedman's market
libertarianism, oddly enough, can therefore be seen as not only
contemporaneous but also consonant with the ideals expressed
in Brown.
But Friedman was ahead of his time. Although a few social
scientists embraced vouchers in the late 1960s and 1970s as part
of ambitious redistributive programs, (pp. 55-57) 32 and President
Ronald Reagan submitted several voucher bills to Congress in
the mid-1980s, the idea failed to attract broad-based support.
Instead, vouchers "increasingly became identified with conservative politics and the Christian coalition" and, worse, with the

31. See Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement
162 (Harcourt Brace Sovanovich, 1980); Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 86-87
(U. of Chicago Press, 1962).
32. See generally, e.g., Jencks, Education Vouchers (cited in note 14); Coons and
Sugarman, Family Choice in Education (cited in note 14); Coons, Clune, and Sugarman,
Private Wealth and Public Education (cited in note 14). See also John E. Coons and
Stephen D. Sugarman, Education by Choice: The Case for Family Control (U. of California Press, 1978).
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"choice academies" that had hamstrung the implementation of
Brown. (p. 57)
Educational-choice supporters turned instead-some might
say they lowered their sights-to magnet schools, private management of government schools, charter schools, and publicschool-only choice. (pp. 57-79) But, as Viteritti sees it, the problem with these controlled-choice programs-notwithstanding
their successes-has been "not enough choice, too much control." (p. 59)33 Charter schools, for example, are "hot." 34
Thirty-four States enacted charter laws in the last decade, making these schools "the most revolutionary idea in education for
the 1990s." (p. 64) 35 The hope is that the competitive incentives
and diversity promised by comprehensive, Friedman-style school
choice can be achieved within a more decentralized, but still
public, system of charter schools.36 And, on the political front,
one advantage of charter schools is that they appear to enjoy bipartisan support. Indeed, "[f]or Democratic politicians aligned
with teachers unions and other education groups, [the charterschool movement] represented a convenient compromise on
choice: no funding for private schools, no church-state entanglements, a mechanism for increased accountability." (p. 71)
Still, the teachers' unions are skeptical enough about decentralization that many States' charter-school laws reflect accommodations to union concerns more than whole-hearted acceptance of
choice. (p. 70) As a result, Viteritti complains, charter schools
are often undermined by the very re;ulatory burdens they were
designed to circumvent. (pp. 71-72) 3
33. See Christine H. Rossell, Controlled-Choice Desegregation Plans: Not Enough
Choice, Too Much Control, 31 Urb. Aff. Rev. 43 (Sept. 1995).
34. See generally, e.g., Marilyn Brown, Whatever Else They Are, Charter Schools
Are Hot, Tampa Trib. 6 (Nov. 21, 1999); Charter Schools to Receive Aid; Clinton Lauds
Idea, Grants $95 Million, Wash. Post A12 (Aug. 29, 1999); June Kronholz, Gore JO-Year,
$115 Billion Schools Plan Includes Aid for Teachers in Poor Areas, Wall St. J. A16 (Dec.
17, 1999) ("Mr. Gore also called for tripling the number of charter schools, which arc
publicly funded schools that aren't part of the regular school-district bureaucracy"),
35. See Chester E. Finn, et al., What If All Schools Were Schools of Choice?,
Weekly Standard 26 (June 19, 2000) ("[Charter schools] are looking like a possible alternative to the [public-school] system itself, foreshadowing a far different public-education
system than we now know").
36. For an excellent summary of where things stand today with charter schools, sec
the United States Department of Education's report, The State of Charter Schools 2000:
Fourth-Year Report (Jan. 2000) (available at <http://www.cd.gov/pubs/chartcr4thycar/>).
37. See, e.g., Editorial, Charter Hypocrisy, Wall St. J. A26 (Oct. 20, 1999) ("When it
comes to actual treatment of the nation's fledgling charter schools, the Clinton Administration follows another policy: It tortures them"); David A. DcSchryver, Strong Charter
School Laws: A Necessary Condition for the "Ripple Effect," 11 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 311
(2000). It would seem to be a mistake to be too dour about the promise of charter
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"Controlled choice" -like the other post-Brown, government-centered efforts-seems doomed to fall short of its potential. Free choice, Viteritti insists, can do better. As James
Coleman found in the early 1980s, and as has been re-confirmed
again and again, private schools-particularly Catholic schoolsby and large work well for disadvantaged inner-city children.
(pp. 80-116) Coleman found, for example, that even controlling
for students' family background, private schools produce better
cognitive outcomes; provide a safer, more disciplined, and more
racially integrated learning environment; offer more academically focused courses; and better cultivate self-esteem than do
public schools. (pp. 80-81 )38 Sociologist Andrew Greeley has
reached similar conclusions, leading him to tout the benefits of
the "Catholic school effect." (pp. 82-86)39 As best-selling author

schools, though. See, e.g., Finn, What If All Schools Were Schools of Choice (cited in
note 35); Scott Milliman, et al., Do Charter Schools Improve District Schools? Three Approac/zes to the Question, in Robert Maranto, et al., eds., School Choice in the Real
World: Lessons from Arizona Charter Schools (Western Press, 1999).
38. James S. Coleman, et al., High School Achievement: Public, Catholic and Private Schools Compared (Basic Books, 1982). To be sure, as Viteritti recounts, Coleman's
methodology and findings were, and continue to be, vigorously disputed. (p. 81-82) See,
e.g., Jeff Neurauter, On Educational Vouchers: Revisiting the Assumptions, Legal Issues,
and Policy Perspectives, 17 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 459, 462-469 (1996) (collecting
and summarizing work of Coleman's critics). That said, Coleman confirmed his findings
five years later in a study whose methodology was designed to respond to his critics. See
James S. Coleman and Thomas Hoffer, Public, Catholic and Private Schools: The Importance of Community (Basic Books, 1987); see also Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 131, 183 (1995) ("A review of the
literature, however, suggests that the dispute [between Coleman and his critics] is less
substantive than the participants make it out to be"); Thomas B. Hoffer, Catholic School
Attendance and Student Achievement: A Review and Extension of Research, in James
Youniss and John J. Convey, eds., Catholic Schools at the Crossroads: Survival and
Transformation (Teachers College Press, 2000).
39. Andrew Greeley, Catholic High Schools and Minority Students (Transaction
Books, 1982). See also Anthony S. Bryk, et al., Catholic Schools and the Common Good
(Harvard U. Press, 1993); Youniss and Convey, Catholic Schools at the Crossroads (cited
in note 38). For a very different and provocative take on Catholic schools, see generally
James G. Dwyer, Religious Schools v. Children's Rights (Cornell U. Press, 1998). Although Professor Dwyer's arguments against parents' rights and his defense of children's
welfare as he sees it are powerful, his tendentious portrait of Catholic schools, and his
claim that these schools-and, evidently, Catholicism generally-are often harmful to
children is fatally undermined by his reliance on highly polemical accounts of Catholic
education. See also Stephen L. Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools: Reflections on
Pierce 70 Years Later, 27 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1194, 1209 (1997) ("[S]uch arguments as
these rest on questionable empirical propositions about what values children learn, and
where, supported principally by anti-religious stereotypes rather than by any hard analysis of how religions operate"). For a detailed critique of Dwyer's book, see Stephen G.
Gilles, Hey, Christians! Leave Your Kids Alone!, 16 Const. Comm. 149 (1999).
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and "lapsed Presbyterian" Tom Wolfe put it, "I'm not Catholic,
but I have eyes. "40
The success of Catholic schools might seem reason enough
to experiment with inclusive school-choice programs,41 but the
"paradoxical politics of choice" are not so simple. (pp. 86-92)
Viteritti captures this paradox well, describing the defeat of congressional Republicans' attempt to enact school choice in (or,
impose choice on) the District of Columbia (p. 90):
The bill died, but not before treating the nation to a political
spectacle that dramatized the paradox and irony behind the
choice debate. A Republican House majority had drafted a
law that was more consistent with the redistributive politics of
liberal sociologist Christopher Jencks than with the market
model of conservative economist Milton Friedman. It was defeated by a Democratic majority in the Senate at the behest of
a Democratic president who had just enjoyed a resounding reelection victory with strong support from black voters. Clinton epitomized one of the great dilemmas of liberal Democratic politics: on the one hand, sympathetic to the plight of the
disadvantaged, concerned with the tragic condition of public
education in cities; on the other hand, deeply indebted to the
education establishment and the powerful teachers unions.

Still, despite the stalemate in Washington, D.C., inclusive schoolchoice programs are underway in Milwaukee (pp. 98-108)42 and
40. John Burger, Tom Wolfe: Catholic Schools Are The Right Stuff, Nat') Cath. Reg.
3 (Mar. 19-25, 2000). Indeed, voucher opponents appear to agree-at least for litigation
purposes-that religious schools out-perform public schools. After all, as Viteritti has
observed, one constitutional argument against choice is that it "provides parents with a
compelling incentive to attend religious schools." The premise of this argument, of
course, is that "parochial schools are so academically superior to public schools that
when given a choice to send their children to religious institutions, parents find the offer
irresistible." Joseph P. Viteritti, School Choice and American Constitutionalism, Paper
Presented at the Conference, "Charter Schools, Vouchers, and Public Education," Program on Education Policy and Governance, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University (Mar. 10, 2000) (on file with author); see also Simmons-Harris v.
Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 959 (6th Cir. 2000) ("This program provides incentives for parents
to choose schools other than mainstream public ones ...")
41. Although Coleman's study focused on Catholic and non-Catholic private
schools, Choosing Equality has little to say about-nor am I aware of research detailing-the performance of inner-city and low-income students in non-religious and nonCatholic private schools. So, it is not clear how much force the "Catholic school effect"
argument for school choice should have in areas with no or few Catholic schools. Because a government-sponsored school-choice program could not, of course, limit privateschool participation to Catholic schools, one might reasonably insist that more study of
the non-Catholic private schools likely to participate in choice programs is needed.
42. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the Milwaukee program-which includes
religious schools-in Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
997 (1998).
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Cleveland; (pp. 108-113)43 a sweeping state-wide program was
enacted in Florida;44 and these efforts have been complemented
by an array of private initiatives sponsored by religious groups,
business organizations, and philanthropists. (pp. 92-98)45
Viteritti concedes that the jury is out on whether pilot
school-choice programs can produce consistently the kind of
marked improvements in participating students' performances
that the "Catholic school effect" would suggest are possible.
(pp. 113-16) But given what we know about the troubles facing
urban public schools, the success of Catholic schools, the early
indicators from the choice programs that have been permitted to
inch forward, 46 and the apparent wishes of poor parents, there
are, in Viteritti's view, no good reasons not to press ahead.
True, we do not yet know how well school choice will work.
Still, Viteritti has insisted, "the most compelling argument for
choice remains a plea for fairness. We don't need numbers to
prove that. " 47

43. The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the Cleveland program did not violate
the Establishment Clause, although it did violate a technical provision of the Ohio Constitution. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999). The program was
quickly re-enacted, and its opponents just as quickly convinced a federal judge that it did
violate the Establishment Clause after all. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834
(N.D. Ohio 1999). Just as this Essay was going to press, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000).
44. See generally, e.g., Florida Begins Voucher Plan for Education, N.Y. Times
(Abstracts) 15 (Aug. 17, 1999). Florida Governor Jeb Bush signed the new religious
school voucher program in law on June 21, 1999. A legal challenge to the program is
pending. See Holmes v. Bush, No. CV 99-3370, 2000 WL 526364 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Mar. 14,
2000) (invalidating program on state-law grounds); see also Jodi Wilgoren, School
Vouchers Are Ruled Unconstitutional in Florida, N.Y. Times A20 (Mar. 15, 2000).
45. For a detailed, current account of school-choice developments across the Nation, see Nina Shokraii Rees, School Choice: What's Happening in the States 2000 (The
Heritage Foundation). This publication is updated regularly at <http://www.heritage.
org>.
46. For more on the effectiveness of school-choice programs, see generally, e.g.,
Peterson, 6 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. (cited in note 22); Paul E. Peterson, et al., The Effectiveness of School Choice in Milwaukee: A Secondary Analysis of Data from the Program's Evaluation (1996); Cecilia Elena Rouse, Private School Vouchers and Student
Achievement: An Evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program 4 (Dec. 1996).
For a more mixed-but still generally positive-review of the Milwaukee program, see
John F. Witte, Jr., The Market Approach to Education: An Analysis of America's First
Voucher Program (Princeton U. Press, 2000). Witte recently concluded that school
choice is a "useful tool to aid low-income families." Joe Williams, Ex-Milwaukee Evaluator Endorses School Choice, Milw. J. & Sent. 1 (Jan. 9, 2000). But see, e.g., Bruce Fuller,
et al., School Choice: Abundant Hopes, Scarce Evidence of Results 84 (Policy Analysis for
California Education, 1999) ("The scarcity of sound evidence on ... choice is troubling").
47. Joseph P. Viteritti, School Choice: Beyond the Numbers, Educ. Week 38 (Feb.
23,2000).
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Maybe not. But still, even if reforms in education are
needed, and even if school choice could work, and is fair-are
vouchers constitutional? More generally, is there a danger, as
some charge, that school choice will "take from the pluribus to
destroy the unum"? 48 Is it true that "public, not private, schooling is ... the primary means by which citizens can morally educate future citizens"?49 Is "[pJublic education [really] one of our
most cherished institutions" 0 and, if so, does school choice
threaten that institution? In the end, is school choice good policy for a diverse, liberal, and secular society?

III
"Opponents of school choice continue to argue that, notwithstanding its merits as a vehicle for fulfilling the promise of
educational equality articulated in Brown, the expenditure of
public funds for students to attend reli~ious schools violates federal ... constitutional law." (p. 116) 1 Viteritti insists that it
doesn't. (pp. 117-44)52 He agrees with those who say that exces48. Michael Kelly, Dangerous Minds, New Republic 6 (Dec. 30, 1996).
49. Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education 10 (Princeton U. Press, 1987).
50. Minersville Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 598 (1940), overruled, West Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). It's safe to say that Justice Frankfurter's conclusion in Gobitis that West Virginia could force Jehovah's Witnesses to salute the school flag would not likely prove as popular today with public-school champions as docs his common-school rhetoric.
51. I assume that Professor Viteritti means to say, "notwithstanding the arguments
that school choice could be an effective vehicle .... " I am not aware of school-choice
opponents, or of First Amendment strict-scparationists, who concede that school choice
would realize Brown's promise.
52. To barely scratch the surface of the debate, see, e.g., Steffen N. Johnson, A Civil
Libertarian Case for the Constitutionality of School Choice, 10 Geo. Mason Univ. Civ. R.
L.J. 1 (1999/2000); Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 Notre
Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 341 (1999); Martha Minow, Choice or Commonality: Welfare and Schooling After the End of Welfare as We Knew It, 49 Duke L.J. 493 (1999); Ira
C. Lupu, The Increasingly Anachronistic Case Against School Vouchers, 13 Notre Dame
J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 375 (1999); Abner S. Greene, Why Vouchers Are Unconstitutional, and Why They're Not, 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 397 (1999).
The upshot of this scholarship seems to be an emerging consensus that "the Court
would uphold an educational voucher scheme that would permit parents to decide which
schools, public or private, their children should attend." Laurence H. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law § 14-10, at 1223 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1988). The Supreme
Court's recent decision in Mitchell v. Helms-both Justice Thomas's plurality opinion
and Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion-will likely shore up this consensus. Sec,
e.g., 530 U.S. 793, 2000 WL 826256, at *25 (2000) (plurality opinion) ("Chapter 2 docs
not result in governmental indoctrination, because it determines eligibility for aid neutrally, allocates that aid based on the private choices of the parents of schoolchildren, and
does not provide aid that has an impermissible content"); id. at *31 ("[W]hcn government aid supports a school's religious mission only because of independent decisions
made by numerous individuals to guide their secular aid to that school, no reasonable
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sive devotion to the "wall of separation" metaphor has resulted
in a skewed understanding of the First Amendment. He argues
that the egalitarian pluralism embraced by James Madison, (pp.
121-26)53 considered in light of the Framers' own religious views,
(pp. 126-29)54 provides a solid foundation for a coherent, nondiscriminatory Establishment Clause jurisprudence. (pp. 13543)55 Viteritti concludes that "[t]he Rehnquist Court has promulgated a set of legal principles that makes it possible for the
government to provide tuition assistance to parents of children
who attend religious schools so long as such aid is administered
in a neutral fashion and students attend such schools as a matter
of parental choice." (p. 143)56
But here's the more difficult question: even if legislators
may, consistent with the First Amendment, include religious
schools in school-choice programs, does it follow that they must?
Viteritti reports, without elaboration,57 that "any government action that specifically excludes religious institutions from participation in a publicly sponsored choice program open to nonreli-

observer is likely to draw ... an inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious
practice or belieP') (O'Connor, J., concurring).
53. On James Madison's views concerning religious freedom, see generally John
Noonan, The Lustre of Our Country: The American Experience of Religious Freedom (U
of California Press, 1998).
54. See, e.g., Volokh, 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y at 351 (cited in note
52) ("[M]y sense of the Framers' worldview is that they did not think the government
was required to discriminate against religion").
55. Just such a jurisprudence is developing. See, e.g., Jackson v. Benson, 578
N.W.2d 602, 613 (1998) ("Although the lines with which the Court has sketched the
broad contours of this inquiry [into a statute's effects] are fine and not absolutely
straight, the Court's decisions generally can be distilled to establish an underlying theory
based on neutrality and indirection"), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998); Kotterman v.
Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 614-15 (1999) (following Jackson and upholding Arizona's $500 tax
credit for donations to "school tuition organizations"), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 921 (1999);
Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 209-10 (Ohio 1999) (relying on neutrality of
program criteria and role of independent parental choice in holding that program does
not violate the Establishment Clause). But see Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp.
2d 834, 864-65 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (invalidating Cleveland program because "it cannot be
said that aid only flows to religious institutions as a result of the independent and private
choices of recipients"), afPd, Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000).
56. Again, the Court's recent decision in Mitchell seems to confirm Viteritti's analysis, although Justice O'Connor was careful in her concurring (and controlling) opinion to
insist that the "neutrality" of government aid-while an "important" factor to considermight not be sufficient, in every case, to overcome an Establishment Clause challenge.
Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793, 2000 WL 826256, at *28 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57. Viteritti notes later that several recent state supreme court decisions "leave unresolved" the question "whether a state can discriminate against parochial schools in a
publicly supported program open to other private schools" and predicts that "the Court
will ... strike down laws that specifically exclude religious schools or their students from
benefits provided on a universal basis." (p. 179)
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gious private schools is likely to raise questions of discrimination
before the Court." (p. 143) I think he's right, but it's worth explaining why.
The theme that "government may not use religion as a basis
for classification for the imposition of duties, penalties, privileges
or benefits" 58 pervades constitutional law. More and more, it is
urged that various constitutional provisions work together, complementing each other, to guarantee religious liberty by forbidding discrimination-that is, by requiring "equality"-in matters
of religion. Viteritti's chapter on school choice and the First
Amendment is titled "Equality as Religious Freedom;" perhaps
it could have been called, "Religious Freedom Through Equality." In any event, the upshot of this emerging synergetic view is
that excluding religious schools from otherwise general and neutral education-benefits programs presumptively violates the Free
Speech, Establishment, and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause.59
First, the Establishment Clause itself protects individuals'
ability to exercise freely, or refrain from exercising, their religion
by mandating that government not use its power to skew the decision for (or against) religious faith and practice. 60 That is, the
government may not "establish" religion, not because religion is
suspect or to be feared-quite the contrary-but because it is a
good thing for people to exercise religion freely. 61 And so, just
58. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment).
59. I can provide only an outline of these arguments. For more detailed scholarly
discussions, see, e.g., Volokh, 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y at 365-73 (cited in
note 52); see also, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to
the Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on 'Equal Access' for Religious
Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 653, 675-700 (1996); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Es•
tablishment Clause Litigation, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 311, 326-50 (1986). And in the
courts, compare, e.g., Peter v. Wedi, 155 F.3d 992, 996-97 (8th Cir. 1998) ("Government
discrimination based on religion violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment .... the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment ....and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"), with KDM v. Reedsport Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d
1046 (9th Cir. 1999) (Oregon regulation which denied educational services available to
private-school students to student in a religious school did not violate First or Fourteenth
Amendments).
60. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753
{1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (government
may not make "adherence to a religion relevant ... to a person's standing in the political
community").
61. Put slightly differently, we protect religious liberty through the Religion Clauses
because religion is a positive good, and worth protecting. Sec John Garvey, What Are
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as surely as the Establishment Clause prohibits government conduct that promotes, advances, or endorses religion, it guards with
equal vigor against any government discrimination toward, or
official disapproval of, faith. The state may neither advance nor
inhibit reliW:ion;62 it should neither favor nor display hostility toward faith; 3 it may not endorse or disapprove religion. 64
Second, the Free Exercise Clause affirmatively prohibits
governments from "impos[ing] special disabilities on the basis of
religious views or religious status." 65 That is, the state may not
"discriminate[] against some or all religious beliefs or regulate[]
or prohibit[] conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons."66 It is no less discriminatory, the argument goes, to deny
otherwise-generally-available benefits-school vouchers, for instance-on the basis of religion than to single out religious conduct for prohibition or disfavor. The Free Exercise Clause
would not permit government to say, "every retiree gets $30,000
per year, unless they plan on spending any of that money on Bibles," nor should it permit government to say, "education is so
important to our community that every child is entitled to a publicly funded education at the public or private school of his or
her parents' choice, unless the parents select a religious private
school. " 67

Freedoms For? (Harvard U. Press, 1996); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, God Is Great,
Gan•ey ls Good: Making Sense of Religious Freedom, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1597, 1597
(1997) ("Garvey's claim is that we protect religious freedom for the sake of religion ....
[He] argues that the religion clauses reflect a religious premise, exist for the sake of protecting religion, and ought to be read in that light"). This claim-which strikes me as a
powerful one-would seem to call into question the Court's newfound habit in First
Amendment cases of treating and protecting faith as just another form of expression, and
religion as just another "viewpoint" to be tolerated. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rectors and
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
62. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,218 (1997).
63. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,443 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
64. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,585 (1987). As Professor Volokh
observes, statements like these-implying a positive Establishment Clause "evenhandedness" requirement-"have largely been dicta." Volokh, 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics &
Pub. Pol'y at 369 (cited in note 52). One reason why it might be difficult to frame a case
where government conduct was hostile to or inhibited religion in violation of the Establishment Clause is that any such conduct would most likely be analyzed under the Free
Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993).
65. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
66. Church of the Lukumi BabaluAye, Inc. 508 U.S. at 532.
67. See Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973, 977-79 (6th Cir. 1995) (excluding religious
day-care centers from general program that permits child-care providers to use government housing on military bases is discrimination that violates the Free Exercise Clause).
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Third, the Free Speech Clause is now understood to prohibit the government from discriminating against religious
speech or expression. 68 How might a school-choice program implicate the Free Speech Clause? There are (at least) two possibilities. For starters, when schools express ideas and values to
students and to the world through their curricula, programs, and
teachers, they engage in core First Amendment "speech. " 69
What's more, parents' decisions about where and how to educate
their children, and about the messages, information, and values
that will be imparted to their children, are for many parents
among the most important "expressions" of their lives. Indeed,
for many low-income parents (and for their children), educational choices may be one of the few available vehicles for expressing their beliefs-and, in a sense, for publicizing, through
their educational choices, those beliefs-about matters of ultimate concern.70 In other words, the Free Speech argument for
non-discriminatory choice programs has two parts: the government may not discriminate against schools based on the religious
content of their "speech," i.e., their curricular programs; nor may
it discriminate against the religiously motivated educational decisions-again, the "expression" -of parents and students.
Finally, discrimination on the basis of religion violates the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 71 That
68. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995) (state university that funded student activities generally could not single out religious newspaper for denial of funds); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (following Widmar in elementary-school context);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (if college opens classrooms to secular meetings it
must open them to religious meetings). See generally Paulsen, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at
653-62 (cited in note 59) (summarizing and analyzing the Widmar line of cases).
69. See generally Johnson, 10 Geo. Mason Univ. Civ. R. L.J. at 31-36 (cited in note
52). Cf. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277,289 (2000) ("[N]ude dancing of the type
at issue here is expressive conduct, although we think that it falls only within the outer
ambit of the First Amendment's protection").
70. See generally Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 937, 1012-33 (1996) (arguing that "parents have a free-speech
right to communicate their values to their children both directly and through the speech
of teachers and schools"). Some have argued, though, that this line of argument and the
instrumental view of children upon which it is thought to rest arc profoundly illiberal,
and even offensive, at least to the extent that parents' interests in communicating values
to their children are allowed to trump the children's own temporal interests (as determined by third parties). See, e.g., Dwyer, Religious Schools v. Children's Rights at 90-96
(cited in note 39). But sec Gilles, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 951-60, supra, (arguing that a
"parcntalist" allocation of rights is in children's best interests).
71. See, e.g., Peter v. Wedi, 155 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998) ("Government discrimination based on religion violates the ... Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment"); cf. Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dept., 728 A.2d 127, 137 (Mc. 1999) (exclusion of religious schools from tuitioning program would be unconstitutional under the
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Clause requires that "certain traits, including religion and ... religiosity, should not be bases for governmental classifications."72
Once government elects to provide a public-welfare benefiteducation -it may not single out religious people and religious
institutions for a shoddier version of that benefit, any more than
it could decide to reduce the Fire Department's budget by telling
it not to bother with "house calls" to churches.73
These four provisions, working together, provide the basis
for a formidable argument that the exclusion of religious schools
from otherwise-generally-available school-choice programsthat is, from programs that are open to non-religious private
schools-is unconstitutional discrimination against religion and
religious expression. Under this approach, such exclusion is not
simply a "refusal to subsidize" religion. 74 It is, instead, a decision
to specially disadvantage religion in the context of a decision to
fund education-public and private-generally. 75 Of course, the
States are not required-at least, not until the Court is convinced by Professor Viteritti that Brown's _gromise requires otherwise!-to enact school-choice programs. But if they do, they
can no more single out religious choices, persons, or institutions
for special disadvantage in the context of those programs than
they could prevent otherwise-eligible Mass-going Catholics from
running for office.77
Equal Protection Clause were it not justified by the government's "compelling" interest
in complying with the Establishment Clause"), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 947 (1999); Strout v.
Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 64 (1st Cir. 1999) (rejecting equal-protection challenge to exclusion of religious schools from tuitioning program schools because "the state's compelling
interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation requires that the statute exclude
sectarian schools from the tuition program"), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 931 (1999). See generally, Paulsen, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 356-59 (cited in note 59) (applying "Equal Protection Model" to school vouchers).
72. Volokh, 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y at 371 (cited in note 52).
73. Id. at 370-71 & n.60.
74. Cf. Strout, 178 F.3d at 60; Bagley, 728 A.2d at 135.
75. See, e.g., Wedi, 155 F.3d at 1001-02; KDM, 196 F.3d at 1053 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("Handicapped children at secular private schools get special education in their
schools, but handicapped children at religious private schools must leave school to get
the same special education. This law violates the Constitution because it distinguishes
between people and burdens some of them on account of their religious practices").
76. Topeka, Kansas was not required, in 1954, to operate public schools. But once
it had chosen to operate such schools, it was not permitted to discriminate on the basis of
race in their operation. As the Court observed in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,597
(1972), "(we have] made clear that even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable government benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely" (emphasis added).
77. Cf. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (invaliding on free-exercise grounds a
Tennessee constitutional provision barring "ministers of the Gospel or priests of any denomination whatever" from serving as delegates to a constitutional convention).
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IV
Viteritti contends-persuasively, in my view-that the federal Constitution permits States to experiment with religionneutral school-choice programs. However, Viteritti warns,
"[M]any states have provisions within their constitutions that set
strict separationist standards and prohibit direct or indirect aid
to religious institutions." (p. 144) These provisions-many of
which were inserted into States' constitutions specifically to prevent students from using public money to attend Catholic
schools-probably pose more significant barriers to choice-based
reform than does the First Amendment. (pp. 168-79)
Viteritti's discussion of these state laws, of the nativist fears
that often inspired them, and of the Blaine Amendment that was
in many cases their model, is perhaps Choosing Equality's most
important contribution. (pp. 145-68) It is important because
many who today oppose school choice invoke the claimed
achievements and ideals of our common-school tradition, contending-at least implicitly-that the homogenization and monopolization by government of American education should be
credited with building our modern, diverse, liberal, and literate
society. 78 But one need not deny the successes, and even the
strengths, of American public education to recognize that the
common-school movement and its later Progressive reincarnations were in large part animated-even in respectable
circles-by the anti-Catholicism that historian Arthur
Schlesinger, Sr., once called the "the deepest bias in the history
of the American people."79
Viteritti sets out the often overlooked (in courts and law
schools, anyway) story of how Horace Mann and his followers
used the common schools to impose on Catholic immigrants and

78. See, e.g., Ted Forstmann, Break Up the Education Monopoly. Wall St. J. A26
(Sept. 9, 1999) ("The U.S., we are led to believe, was founded upon a system of government-provided education; tinker with it, and you tinker with the underpinnings of our
democracy. In reality, government-delivered education-a.k.a. 'public education'wasn't established until roughly a century after our country's founding. The system it
replaced-the system of education our country was founded upon-was characterized
above all by diversity, competition, and choice"). See generally Andrew J. Coulson,
Market Education: The Unknown History (Transaction Publishers, 1999).
79. John Tracy Ellis, American Catholicism 151 (2d ed. 1969); see also Peter Steinfels, Of Bob Jones U., American Culture, and Anti-Catholicism, N.Y. Times B17 (Mar, 4,
2000) ("[O]pposing anti-Catholicism in the United States by denouncing Bob Jones is
about as relevant to today's reality as combating medical errors by condemning leeches
and snake oil. The Catholic Church takes more nasty hits weekly on cable television
than yearly from Bob Jones").
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other religious minorities the "non-sectarian" 80 values of the "de
facto Protestant Establishment"; 81 how fears about immigration,
the overwrought rantin§s of nativist ministers, and goofy paranoia about "nunneries" 2 contributed to the rise of the Know
Nothings;83 how the political calculations of James G. Blaine and
President Grant nearly resulted in a constitutional amendment
aimed at fixing the "defect"-namely, the lack of a clear prohibition on aid to religious schools-in the United States Constitution;84 and how, notwithstanding Blaine's failure, by 1890,
twenty-nine States had "baby Blaine" amendments in their constitutions. 85 Another anti-aid wave, and then the pragmatic secularism of Mann's descendant, John Dewey, (pp. 157-61) swept
through the statute books in the early twentieth century. (pp.

80. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 2000 WL 826256, at *24 (2000) (plurality
op.) ("[I]t was an open secret that 'sectarian' was code for Catholic"). See generally, e.g.,
Richard A. Baer, The Supreme Court's Discriminatory Use of the Term 'Sectarian,' 6 J. L.
& Pol. 449 (1990); Carter, 27 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 1199 (cited in note 39) ("The common
school, which was sold to the public on expressly religious grounds, simply cannot be understood except as an effort to Protestantize the immigrant children"). But see Stephen
Macedo, Diversity and Distrust 88 (Harvard U. Press, 2000) ("It is too simple to say that
the early common schools were in the business of 'Protestantizing' Catholic immigrants . . . . To a significant degree, the common schools represented a shared civic vision. Convergence on that vision could not ... be taken for granted").
81. Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness 31 (U. of Chicago Press,
1965).
82. Lloyd P. Jorgenson, The State and the Non-Public School 1825-1925 at 88 (U. of
Missouri Press, 1987) (describing Massachusetts' "Nunnery Investigation Committee");
see also Maria Monk, The Awful Disclosures of Maria Monk, as Exhibited in a Narrative
of Her Sufferings During a Residence of Five Years as a Novice and Two Years as a Black
Nun, in the Hotel Dieu Nunnery in Montreal (Maria Monk, 1836).
83. Abraham Lincoln once observed of the Know Nothings that "[w]hen the KnowNothings get control, [the Declaration of Independence] will read 'all men are created
equal except Negroes and foreigners and Catholics."' Letter from Abraham Lincoln to
Joshua Speed (Aug. 24, 1855), reprinted in R. Basler, ed., 2 The Collected Works of
Abraham Lincoln 320,323 (Rutgers U. Press, 1953).
84. The amendment's sponsor, Representative James G. Blaine of Maine, "fully
understood the wide political appeal of the nativist and anti-Catholic rhetoric that accompanied [President U.S. Grant's] agenda and intended to take full advantage of it."
(p. 152) Viteritti writes that Blaine's "name would live in perpetuity as a symbol of the
irony and hypocrisy that characterized much future debate over aid to religious schools:
employing constitutional language, invoking patriotic images, appealing to claims of individual rights. All these ploys would serve to disguise the real business that was at hand:
undermining the viability of schools run by religious minorities to prop up and perpetuate a publicly supported monopoly of government-run schools." (p. 153)
85. Arizona's Supreme Court noted recently that "[t]he Blaine Amendment was a
clear manifestation of religious bigotry, part of a crusade manufactured by the contemporary Protestant establishment to counter what was perceived as a growing Catholic
menace." Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 624 (Ariz. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 921
(1999); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 2000 WL 826256, *24 (2000) (plurality
op.) ("Consideration of the [Blaine Amendment] arose at a time of pervasive hostility to
the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general").
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154-55)86 Viteritti concludes that, rather than a model for community-building education in a diverse society, "the history of
the common school movement is a telling story of the risks involved when a political majority is allowed to establish a monopoly over education and impose its values on other people's
children." (p. 150) In fact, Viteritti observes, "there is no episode in the American chronicle that better illustrates the inherent dangers of majority rule that so preoccupied Madison than
the history of the common school." (p. 145) 87
The point of this history is that the federal constitutional issues surrounding school choice are like "level one" of the typical
Nintendo or Sega video game: Super Mario, for example, avoids
calamity after calamity only to face still other, even more formidable challenges-here, the congealed nativism still entrenched
in many States' constitutions. 88 And so, Viteritti is concerned
that "the relief that advocates of school choice can expect to derive from the High Court will prove to be circumscribed and unsatisfying. . . . For this reason, the monopoly that governmentoperated institutions enjoy over public funding remains secure."
(p.179)
I'm not so sure. First, if the argument outlined above is correct-i.e., if the Constitution not only permits the inclusion of religious schools in school-choice programs but also forbids their
discriminatory exclusion-then this federal equal-treatment
mandate cannot be trumped by state constitutional provisions
that purport to require discrimination. As Justice Brennan once
emphasized, the States are free through their own constitutions
to provide greater protection to individuals from government
than does the Bill of Rights. 89 But while it is fairly easy to see
86. Viteritti sees some liberal theorists-Bruce Ackerman, Amy Gutmann, Stephen
Macedo, and others-as continuing in this mold (pp. 164-68). Sec, e.g., Gutmann, Democratic Education at 21 (cited in note 49) (education must "convert children away from
the intensely held beliefs of their parents").
87. See generally Charles Leslie Glenn, Jr., The Myth of the Common School (U. of
Massachusetts Press, 1988); Jorgenson, The State and the Non-Public School (cited in
note 82); Diane Ravitch, The Great School Wars (Basic Books, 1974); John T. McGrccvy,
Thinking on One's Own: Catholicism in the American Intellectual Imagination, 1928-1960,
84 J. Am. Hist. 97 {1997).
88. See generally, Toby J. Heytens, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 Va. L.
Rev. 117 (2000). This is not to say that the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause caselaw gets a "pass" on anti-Catholicism. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 2000 WL
826256, at **23-24 (2000) (plurality opinion). See generally Lupu, 13 Notre Dame J.L.
Ethics & Pub. Pol'y at 385 (cited in note 52 {describing place of anti-Catholicism and
negative stereotypes about Catholic education in the development of modern Establishment Clause doctrine).
89. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
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how this "floor, not ceiling" idea plays out in the context of, say,
a search-and-seizure case, it is not so obvious that the States may
provide extra "protection" from "establishments" of religion if,
in so doing, they purport to forbid the equal treatment of religion that the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause
require. That is, no State's anti-aid provision or "baby Blaine"
amendment can license, let alone demand, what the United
States Constitution forbids. 90
Second, there is ample evidence that many States' anti-aid
provisions were motivated by bigotry-by discriminatory "animus"91-to support an argument that these laws violate the
Equal Protection Clause, as well as the various clauses of the
First Amendment. Several parents are claiming as much in
Boyette v. Galvin, 92 a case challenging Massachusetts' 1854
"Anti-Aid" Amendment (a precursor to the Blaine Amendment(s)).93 The "legislative history" and anti-Catholic purpose
of the Massachusetts Amendment-and of the additional
amendment that purported to prevent the Anti-Aid Amendment
from ever being changed by ballot initiative-are well established. (pp. 148-51)94 The Boyette plaintiffs believe that these
Massachusetts provisions "unfairly shut out people with religious
interests from the electoral process by barring a citizen ballot initiative on the aid issue, while allowing other groups to use ballot
initiatives to change state laws."95
Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977).
90. See U.S. Const., Art. VI ("This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding"); see also, e.g., McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (fact that unconstitutional discrimination against clergy was authorized by state statute did not save the statute); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (rejecting argument that compliance with the State of Missouri's arguably more restrictive
Establishment Clause-type provisions justified discrimination against student groups and
speakers on the basis of their religious speech and activity); cf. Chittenden Town School
Dist. v. Department. of Educ., 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999) (holding that Vermont Constitution required the exclusion of religious schools from tuitioning program and that the
United States Constitution was not violated by such exclusion), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
1066 (1"999).
91. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see also Jeremy Rabkin, Partisan in the
Culture Wars, 30 McGeorge L. Rev. 105, 109 (1998) ("What is the difference between a
state Blaine amendment and the Colorado amendment rejected in Romer?").
92. No. 98-CV-10377 (D. Mass. filed Mar. 3, 1998) (Complaint available at
<http://www.becketfund.org>).
93. See Editorial, Erasing Historic Error, Bos. Herald 12 (Mar. 7, 1998). For more
on the Massachusetts provisions in question, see Jorgenson, The State and the Non-Public
School, at 159-86 (cited in note 82).
94. See generally, Complaint, Boyette v. Galvin, supra note 92, at 'l['l[ 7-23.
95. Diego Ribadeneira, School Aid Suit Cites a History of Bias, Bos. Globe Bl
(Nov. 12, 1998); Complaint, Boyette v. Galvin, supra note 92, at 'l[ 2 ("The Anti-Aid
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Now, it is not clear that either the "federal supremacy" or
"historical animus" arguments against the States' muscular antiaid amendments will succeed. Still, it's hard to see why they
should not. 96 Viteritti's conclusion that, in light of the "baby
Blaines," "religious liberty in America" is "a limited freedom" in
the education context might therefore be a bit too pessimistic, or
at least premature. (p. 179) Perhaps the "promise of Brown"
will one day trump the legacy of Blaine.
V
Choosing Equality closes with a provocative response to the
"school choice divides, but public schools unite" argument. (pp.
180-208) As Viteritti observes, most would agree that "a well
educated citizenry is among the most critical factors for ensuring
the stability of a democracy." (p. 180) And so, he concedes that
"[p]ublic education indeed serves as a foundation for American
democracy as we know it." (p. 181) He insists, though, that the
radical disengagement of public education from religious values
and traditions has handicapped it in performing its task of
"teach[ing] each of us how to live together amicably and productively in a pluralist society." (Id.) And in response to those concerned that private-school choice, and private schools generally,
undermine the res publica and threaten the health of participatory democracy,97 Viteritti praises the role that such mediating

Amendment bars [plaintiffs] from seeking, through the nonnal democratic process, any
fonn of state aid to assist them in meeting the cost of tuition and other expenses at nonpublic schools"). The Boyette plaintiffs also allege violations of the Free Speech, Free
Exercise, Right to Petition, Establishment, and Equal Protection Clauses. Id., at~~ 3551. Cf. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,458 U.S. 457,474 (1982) (holding that a
school-busing-related initiative violated the Equal Protection Clause because it removed
"the authority to address a racial problem-and only a racial problem-from the existing
decisionmaking body in such a way as to burden minority interests").
96. One interesting question is the extent to which the anti-Catholic motives behind
the various States' Blaine-type provisions should control the question whether these provisions are, today, unconstitutional. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985)
("Without deciding whether [Section] 182 would be valid if enacted today without any
impennissible motivation, we simply observe that its original enactment was motivated
by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account of race and the section continues to
this day to have that effect"). These provisions' unsavory purpose should not obscure
the fact that, whatever their purpose, many of them are facially discriminatory against
religion, and therefore presumptively violate the Free Exercise Clause.
97. See, e.g., Minow, 49 Duke L.J. at 495 (cited in note 52) {"Reliance on vouchers
for schooling and welfare indeed can promote competition, pluralism, and at least the
appearance of private choice. However, such reliance risks diminishing the sense of 'we,'
the collective to which everyone in the country should feel connected or responsible").
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institutions have played in "advancing the democratic ethos:"
(p. 183)
Research shows that adults who have attended parochial
schools display high levels of patriotism, tolerance, and civic
involvement.... If designed appropriately, school choice programs would be particularly beneficial to poor communities,
not only extending educational opportunities, but also invigorating civic life and addressing the larger problem of political
inequality that besets economically disadvantaged people. (p
183)98

Viteritti's argument that school choice could help to reengage Americans with their communities, to counter our pervasive cynicism about public institutions, to empower politically
the currently disenfranchised, and to get us bowling together
again, 99 is a powerful one. (pp. 183-208) But in his enthusiasm
for demonstrating that religious schools are "safe," and for reassuring skeptics that religious institutions do not threaten the
civic enterprise, he does not, in my view, respond as forcefully as
he could to the "flip side" problem, that is, to the challenges that
some liberal views of the civic enterprise pose to religious liberty. Although Viteritti assures us that "[i]t is [our] pluralismpolitical, legal, demographic- that will always remain the most
significant safeguard against the threat of an established
church," (p. 195) more should be said about the need for "safeguards against the threat of [the liberal state]."
In the first place, as Viteritti recognizes, such safeguards will
be needed within the context of any school-choice program. Religious schools do strengthen the fabric of civil society and can
provide important secular goods, but it is crucial that they not be
co-opted by or absorbed into the state, and that they not lose
their ability to stand outside of, to challenge, and-if necessaryto subvert the state. 100 And so, while religious schools that par98. Viteritti emphasizes that "(t]here is no discernible evidence that the implementation of public or private school choice would have a negative influence on civil society
in America." (p. 207) See generally Peterson, 6 Va. J. Soc. Pol. & Law at 72-73 (cited in
note 22); Smith and Sikkink, Is Private School Privatizing? (cited in note 22); Greene,
Civic Values in Public and Private Schools at 95-98 (cited in note 22).
99. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community (Simon & Schuster, 2000).
100. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Religious Freedom As If Religion Matters: A Tribute to Justice Brennan, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 1059, 1060 (1999) ("As long as religion avoids the
temptation to join its authority to the authority of the state, it can indeed play a subversive role, because it focuses the attention of the believer on a source of moral understanding that transcends both the authority of positive law and the authority of human
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ticipate in voucher programs could reasonably be required to accept some degree of performance-related oversight, these
schools and their religious missions must be protected from
overly intrusive, message-garbling government regulations. (pp.

221-22) 101

There are also other, perhaps more amorphous, threats to
religious education and to the autonomy of religious schools
posed by contemporary liberalism that are not countered by
Viteritti's confident references to "our pluralism." As he puts it,
"because so few Americans live their lives according to the strict
dictates of their faith," and therefore "the majority of us do not
appreciate the strength of the moral obligations that compel devout observers," there is the "danger" of "oppression by the majority" of "people of conscience." (p. 208) Now, I cannot possibly do justice here to the "Deliberative Democracy, Liberal
Civic Education, and Religion" debate. Suffice it to say that
more than a few leading liberal scholars-perhaps following the
example of some Supreme Court Justices 102 -appear increasingly wary of traditional religious beliefs and willing to question
the extent to which a diverse society grounded in a norm of tolerance can tolerate the pe~etuation of "intolerant" beliefs
through religious education. 10 This line of thinking is, of course,
moral systems").
101. See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, Reli•
gious Nonprofit Organizations, and Liberal Public Values, 75 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 417,432
(2000) (" Although there is nothing we can do to altogether allay concerns about a
voucher system that includes religious schools, there are things that we can do to help
insure that voucher recipients tend to conform with public purposes. I want to defend
the strings that will come attached to vouchers, and argue for their significance"). In•
deed, the threat of intrusive "strings" has lead some to oppose school choice, precisely to
protect authentic religious education. See Scott W. Somerville, The History and Politics
of School Choice, 10 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 121 (1999/2000). This is not an idle
concern. See, e.g., Dwyer, Religious Schools v. Children's Rights at 180 (cited in note 39)
("That Fundamentalist and Catholic schooling as presently constituted would no longer
[i.e., after regulation] exist should not ... be cause for mourning, at least not for anyone
who respects the personhood of children"). For an argument that the Constitution limits
the extent to which regulatory "strings" may interfere with religious schools' missions,
see Paulsen, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 710-17 (cited in note 59).
102. See, e.g., Board. Of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S.
687, 711 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 244-47 (1971)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,635 n.20 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
103. See, e.g., Macedo, Diversity and Distrust at 147 (cited in note 80) ("Some religious beliefs are at odds with liberalism itself. We should tolerate the intolerant ... but
we need not bend over backwards to make life easy for them"); id. at 152 ("The hard fact
is that we cannot make everyone happy. Trying to do so can sell short liberal ideals and
practices that are and will remain partisan and controversial"); Carter, 87 Cal. L. Rev. at
1082 (cited in note 100) (citing and criticizing arguments against religious education
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antithetical to Viteritti's view that religious freedom is inseparable from the central liberal value-equality-and that religious
schools must be key players in the efforts to vindicate that value.
Given the centrality of religious freedom to Viteritti's argument,
Choosing Equality could perhaps have benefitted from a more
muscular defense of religious education against the claims of
"liberal statism." 104
Two final addenda-and each deserves a more detailed
treatment than I can provide here- to Viteritti's discussion
might be useful. First, perhaps because Choosing Equality bends
over backwards to make the "bleeding heart" case for empowering parents (or perhaps simply because of its title), the book's
arguments are couched in "equality" terms-i.e., "poor parents
should be no less able to make choices for their children than
rich parents"-rather than "liberty" terms-i.e., "all parents
have the right to decide, without financial penalty, how to raise
and educate their children." As a result, when Viteritti sets out
his policy proposals, he stops short of full school choice. He recommends, for example, that "[p]articipation in the private (and
parochial) school choice program should be limited to families
that can meet a predetermined objective standard of economic
need" and that those "who would opt out of their regular public
schools for academic reasons should be given a preference over
those who would choose another school for philosophical or religious reasons." (pp. 219-20)1°5
Putting aside (quite reasonable) concerns about political
palatability, it is not clear why such limits are needed or justified.106 True, limiting school-choice programs to low-income
made by Gutmann, Macedo, and Suzanna Sherry); Carter, 27 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 120809 (cited in note 39) (same). It is worth emphasizing that, notwithstanding his extremely
negative view of traditional religious education, James Dwyer does not appear to ground
his arguments in theories about the needs of liberal civil society, but rather in his view of
children's temporal best interests. See Dwyer, Religious Schools v. Children's Rights at
79-101 (cited in note 39).
104. Stephen G. Gilles, Liberal Parentalism and Children's Educational Rights, 26
Cap. U. L. Rev. 9, 11 (1997); Carter, 87 Cal. L. Rev. at 1065 (cited in note 100) ("When I
say statism, I do not simply mean, as the formal definition would suggest, a preference
for state solutions; I have in mind a sense of the state's rightness, or goodness-an empirical belief that the state is less likely than the individual to make a moral error. Since
the Enlightenment, the entire liberal political project has rested on this idea").
105. I certainly do not mean to suggest that Viteritti denigrates the choices of religiously motivated parents (see p. 220) or that he in any way advocates "watering down"
the religious identity of religious schools (p. 10) ("[T]hese schools should not be forced to
compromise the generally pervasive religious climate that makes them what they are").
106. But see John E. Coons, School Choice as Simple Justice, First Things 15 (Apr.
1992) (endorsing proposals similar to Viteritti's).
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parents, or to children in failing schools, is consistent with the
idea that school choice is instrumentally valuable in the struggle
to remedy economic disadvantage and advance Brown's promise
of equality. But what about another, perhaps even stronger, argument for school choice, namely, that in a free and pluralistic
society, decisions about education should be left to parents and
the role of the government limited for the most part to supporting those choices on an equal and nondiscriminatory basis? 107
Viteritti does not seem to disagree with this more liberty-based
argument for choice, so unless restrictions on the scope of choice
programs are, in his view, necessary to achieve his social-justice
ends and equality ideals, perhaps they should be discarded.
This leads to a second, related, Choosing Equality codicil: In
my view, the case for school choice is strongest when tied even
more explicitly than it is in Choosing Equality to the fundamental right of parents to direct and control the upbringing and education of their children. This right was most famously recognized, of course, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 108 Viteritti notes
that Pierce's language "would echo for generations to come, at
once affirming the right of parents to control the upbringing of
their children and the commensurate permissibility of private
and parochial schools to exist as viable alternatives available to
parents." (p. 130) Unfortunately, "[a]s important a victory as
Pierce was for parents, it was only a limited one" (id.), and
Viteritti later expresses regrets that "the promise of....
Pierce" - that is, the promise that parents could "send their children to schools that reflect their own values" - "remains a hollow promise, conditioned to a large degree by the economic position of parents." (p.143)
This is important. More needs to be said about the "promise of Pierce" and its relevance to the school-choice debate. 109
But Viteritti's focus is more the long road to the equality promised in Brown than the near-term threats of statism to Piercestyle liberty, and so he does not confront squarely the fact that
the problem with Pierce is not simply that its "promise" is hard
to realize without money. Rather, it is that the aspect of liberty
107. For such an argument, see generally, e.g., Gilles, Liberal Parentalism and Children's Educational Rights (cited in note 104).
108. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 {1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923). The existence of this fundamental right was re-affirmed most recently in
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) {"The liberty interest at issue in this case ..• is
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court").
109. See generally, e.g., Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools (cited in note 39).
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that case recognized has been slowly eroding, as many courts
have embraced a "poor relation" 110 theory of the right and permitted arguable infringements upon it without applying the strict
scrutiny that incursions upon fundamental freedoms are usually
thought to deserve. m
Just recently, in Troxel v. Granville, 112 the Supreme Court
invalidated an application of Washington's "breathtakingly
broad" 113 third-party-visitation law. The law purported to authorize "any person" to petition a court for visitation rights "at
any time," and it permitted courts to award such rights, over a
parent's objection, whenever, in the court's view, "visitation
[would] serve the best interest of the child." 114 As Justice
O'Connor emphasized in her plurality opinion the law "accorded
no deference" to a parent's decision that third-party visitation
would not be in the child's best interests: "[S]hould the judge disagree with the parent's estimation of the child's best interests,
the judge's view necessarily prevails." 115 In light of the constitutionally grounded presumption that "natural bonds of affection
lead parents to act in the best interests of their children" 116 -a
presumption that the Washington scheme ignored 117 -the Court
110. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) ("We see no reason why
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment ... should be relegated to the status of a
poor relation").
111. See, e.g., Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454,462 (2d Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 813 (1996) ("[W]here, as here, parents seek for secular reasons to exempt their child from an educational requirement and the basis is a claimed right to direct the 'upbringing' of their child, rational basis review applies"); Ohio Ass'n of Indep.
Sch. v. Goff, 92 F.3d 419, 423 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1104 (1997) (stating
that "rational basis review, not strict scrutiny," governs "wholly secular limitations on
private school education"); Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. Of Educ., 89 F.3d
179 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1111 (1997) (concluding that because parents'
"interest is not religious, ... we must reject their position if the [challenged regulation]
bear[s] some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes"); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and
Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525,533 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996) ("We
need not decide here whether the right to rear one's children is fundamental"). The
Court's decision in Troxel should lead to a greater appreciation for the Pierce right in
lower courts. Still, Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion was noteworthy in its failure to
identify clearly the required standard of review. See Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2068 (Thomas,
J. concurring) ("The opinions of the plurality, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter recognize such a right, but curiously none of them articulates the appropriate standard of
review. I would apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights").
112. 530 U.S. 53, 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
113. 120 S. Ct. at 2061.
114. Id. (quoting Wash. Rev. Code§ 26.10.160(3)).
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,602 (1979)); see also Gilles, 63 U. Chi.
L. Rev. at 951-60 (cited in note 70) (examining parents' incentives to act in the best interests of their children).
117. 120 S. Ct. at 2062 ("The decisional framework employed by the Superior Court
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concluded that the visitation order in that case "was an unconstitutional infringement on [the parent's] fundamental right to
make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her
two daughters." 118
Troxel's re-affirmation of the right recognized in Pierce is
particularly noteworthy given that the latter case is-Viteritti
notwithstanding-increasingly criticized both on children'srights and political-theory grounds. 119 At the same time, Pierce
is seen by many as the touchstone for the school-choice question.
Justice Souter's Troxel concurrence, in particular, was explicit in
reminding us that education-related decisions are at the heart of
the liberty protected by Pierce. As he observed, "[T]he strength
of a parent's interest in controlling a child's associates is as obvious as the influence of personal associations on the development
of the child's social and moral character.... Even a State's considered judgment about the preferable political and religious
character of schoolteachers is not entitled to prevail over a parent's choice of private school." 120 This observation seems true to
the Court's famous statement in Pierce itself that
[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the
State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. 121

Troxel-like Pierce-is a challenge and a stumbling block to
those whose opposition to school choice derives from a commitment to the state's prerogative to employ and standardize
education as a means of citizen creation and the development of
a sufficiently "democratic character." 122 What's more, though,
directly contravened the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child").
118. Id. at 2063.
119. See, e.g., Dwyer, Religious Schools v. Children's Rights at 62-101 (cited in note
39); Greene, 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y at 406-08 (cited in note 52) (arguing that Pierce violates key principles of our constitutional structure); Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, "Wiza Owns the Child?: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995 (1992).
120. 120 S. Ct. at 2067 (Souter, J., concurring).
121. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
122. See, e.g., Gutmann, Democratic Education at 64-70 (cited in note 49) ("The
problem with voucher plans is not that they leave too much room for parental choice but
that they leave too little room for democratic deliberation"); Sherry, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev.
at 160-61 (cited in note 38) ("[L]eaving most educational choices to parents or the de-
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these cases strike me as the basis for a strong moral argumentjust as strong as the equality-based argument that Viteritti roots
for in Brown-for pluralism and parental choice in education
and for the autonomy of religious schools. 123 The school-choice
debate is-as Viteritti recognizes (pp. 117-44)-an argument
about more than education reform; it is also about religious
freedom. 124

*****
Viteritti makes a convincing case that school choice need
not divide the polity nor undermine civil society. Even were he
mistaken, though, a little bit of balkanization might just be the
price we pay for allowing individuals to orient their own lives,
and those of their children, toward the Good as they see it.
Choosing Equality makes a strong case that school choice would
advance the cause of equality, but Pierce and Troxel suggest why
we might support school choice even if Viteritti is wrong. My
hope is that Viteritti will not be read to argue that instilling and
shoring up democratic values and public mindedness is a requirement for, and not just a happy side effect of, educational
choice.
Viteritti makes the egalitarian argument for educational
choice with such reasoned and measured passion-as Eugene
Volokh put it to me, Viteritti is "in your face with a breath
mint" - that I feel a bit churlish even hesitating before embracing it. He could well be right-given political realities, particularly when it comes to convincing those predisposed for racialjustice reasons to be suspicious of educational choice- to believe
that equality-based arguments for choice are the most compelling. Still, rhetorical force notwithstanding, it's not clear that
Brown and its "promise" of equality are up to the legal and
moral work that Viteritti demands. While the themes set out in
Brown could well carry the day in the courts of public opinionand Choosing Equality is an excellent brief for those courts-

mocratic process ... assumes, probably erroneously, that parents ... will not make serious, virtue-threatening, education-stifling mistakes").
123. The "parentalist" argument for parental choice and control in education has
been put in play by others. See generally, e.g., Gilles, Liberal Parentalism and Children's
Educational Rights (cited in note 104); Gilles, Liberal Parentalism and Children's Educational Rights (cited in note 70). But see Dwyer, Religious Schools v. Children's Rights at
62-101 (cited in note 39).
124. See Carter, 27 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 1205 (cited in note 39) ("[W]hat Pierce ultimately represents is the judgment that in order to take religious freedom seriously, we
must take the ability of parents to raise their children in their religion seriously").
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religious schools and parents would do well in the meantime to
guard jealously the liberty guaranteed in Pierce.

